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Contribution Between Parties to a Discriminatory Collective
Bargaining Agreement
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes persons injured by a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement to sue the
responsible employer or union for back pay. 1 Title VII's back pay
relief serves two purposes: it compensates the victims of discrimination and deters discriminatory practices.2 The Supreme Court recently agreed to consider whether an employer sued for back pay can
seek contribution3 from a union that "participated in" a collective
bargaining agreement containing a discriminatory term.4 To decide
this issue, the Court will have to consider the effect of contribution
on title VII's compensatory and deterrent purposes.
Courts and scholars have often failed to distinguish rules_ of liability under title VII from rules for the apportionment of a back pay
judgment. Rules of liability determine whom an injured employee
can sue for back pay; rules of apportionment, including rules of contribution and indemnification, determine whom a defendant can
force to contribute to a judgment in favor of an injured plaintiff. 5
Because joint and several liability is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for contribution among parties who are liable to the plaintiff, it is necessary to identify the nature of union and employer liability for title VII back pay before considering rights to contribution.
This Note examines rules of title VII back pay liability and apportionment. 6 Part I argues that all signatories to a discriminatory
I. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). The Civil Rights Act
of 1964 is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, e-1 to e-17 (1976).
2. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
3. Contribution enables a joint tortfeasor who has been sued by a victim to force other
wrongdoers to contribute to the victim's judgment. See w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS§ 50 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980) (employer seeks contribution from union for
back pay judgment under title VII and Equal Pay Act).
5. The term "apportionment" as used here denotes a determination of a defendant's liability to other violators rather than to the plaintiff. The term has another meaning in certain tort
cases. When two or more defendants cause separately measurable harms to the plaintiff, one
breaking the plaintiff's leg and the other breaking his arm, for example, the court will find
each defendant liable for only the injury he himself caused. This determination of each defendant's separate liability to the plaintiff is also called "apportionment." See W. PROSSER,
supra note 3, at § 52. In this Note, however, the term refers only to a determination of one
defendant's liability to another.
6. This Note does not address the question whether employers who violate the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 have a cause of action for contribution against unions that participate in or cause
that violation. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 606 F.2d
1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct 3008 (1980), the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this question along with the question of contribution in title VII cases. Although both
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collective bargaining agreement should be jointly and severally liable to injured persons for back pay. Although a union or employer
may object to joint and several liability if its opponent in collective
bargaining proposed and bargained for the discriminatory term, the
purposes of title VII require that the parties become jointly and severally liable upon signing the agreement. Since joint and several liability fully serves the compensatory purpose of the statute, Part II of
the Note looks to deterrence alone in selecting appropriate rules of
apportionment. Part II concludes that when a plaintiff sues only one
questions concern contribution in employment discrimination cases, the differences between
the Equal Pay Act and title VII raise issues beyond the scope of this Note.
The most prominent difference is that title VII gives to aggrieved employees a cause of
action directly against the union for violations of the statute, see § 706(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e•
5(f) (1976), while the Equal Pay Act does not. Although the Equal Pay Act bars both employers and unions from discriminating or causing wage discrimination on the basis of sex, see 29
U.S.C. §§ 206(d)(l) & (2) (1976), it provides _for suits by aggrieved employees only against
employers, see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. 1977). However, the Act does empower the
government to recover monetary damages from unions violating the Act and to distribute the
funds to the affected employees. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 206(d)(3) (1976 & Supp. 1977); Re•
organization Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 1, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807 (1978) (transferring Equal Pay Act
enforcement from the Secretary of Labor to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); Hodgson v. Sagner, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 371 (D. Md. 1971), ajfd. per curiam sub nom.
Hodgson v. Baltimore Regional Joint Bd., 462 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1972).
The lack of a direct action by employees against unions under the Equal Pay Act has led
some courts to find that the employer has no right of contribution against the union for Equal
Pay Act liability. "[A]n essential prerequisite to contribution, where a right to contribution is
recognized, is common liability. Since labor organizations and employers do not share common liability to employees under the Equal Pay Act, there can be no contribution, which is not
true with Title VII." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 14
Emp. Prac. Dec.~ 7730, at 5597 (D.D.C. 1977), ajfd. in part, revd. in part, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980). See Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d
889 (3d Cir. 1977).
Proponents of contribution respond in two ways. First, they argue that the union is jointly
liable with employers for conduct violating the Equal Pay Act. Joint liability arguably arises
because the union is liable in suits brought by the government, see Hodgson v. Sagner, Inc.,
326 F. Supp. 371 (D. Md. 1971), ajfd. per curiam sub nom. Hodgson v. Baltimore Regional
Joint Bd., 462 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Dunlop v. Beloit College, 411 F. Supp. 398,
402 (W. D. Wis. 1976), and because the legislative history supports an implied cause of action
for damages by aggrieved employees against the union, see Brief for Petitioner at 24-25,
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008
(1980). Second, they argue that contribution is appropriate where the union is liable under
other doctrines of federal law for the same conduct that violates the Equal Pay Act, see gener•
ally Fischbach & Moore Intl. Corp. v. Crane Barge R-14, 476 F. Supp. 282,287 (D. Md. 1979),
and that any conduct violating the Equal Pay Act will also violate title VII, see § 703(h), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
Opponents of contribution argue that the Equal Pay Act and title VII serve different poli•
cies and that contribution will undermine the policy of the Equal Pay Act. The Equal Pay Act
(which is part of the Fair Labor Standards Act) is intended in part to prevent employers from
gaining unfair advantages over competitors by paying discriminatory wages. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 202(a)(3) (1976). ''To allow the employer to recover, by virtue of an implied cause of action
under the Act, a portion of this back pay from a labor organization would place the discriminating employer in an unfairly advantageous position vis-a-vis employers who comply with
the Act. . . ." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 14 Emp.
Prac. Dec. ~ 7730, at 5593 (D.D.C. 1977), ajfd. in part, revd. in part, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C, Cir,
1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980); see Brennan v. Emerald Renovators, Inc., 440 F.
Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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party to a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement, the defendant should be able to require other parties to the agreement to
contribute to any back pay judgment, except when requiring an employer to pay the entire judgment will best deter the formation of
discriminatory contracts.

I. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND THE COMPENSATORY
PURPOSE OF TITLE VII
Title VII should be interpreted as imposing joint and several liability on the parties to a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement. Title VII forbids discrimination by employers and unions,
and prohibits unions from causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate along racial, sexual, ethnic, or religious lines.7
Individual victims may sue discriminating unions and employers in
federal district court. 8 The statute authorizes courts not only to enjoin employer and union discrimination, but also to impose back pay
liability.9 The legislative history reveals that Congress intended
these provisions to combat contractual discrimination by imposing
back pay liability on both unions and employers. 10
7. Section 703(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization (1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise discriminate against, any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or
refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
8. Section 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976), allows aggrieved persons to bring a civil
suit once they have exhausted Equal Employment Opportunity Commission remedies.
9. Section 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
(g) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the
unlawful employment practice) or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing
of a charge with the Commission.
10. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 7206-07 (1964) (Department of Justice statement in remarks
of Sen. Clark), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 3244 (1968). ("[T]itle VII would have no effect on the duties of any employer
or labor organization under the NLRA or under the Railway Labor Act, and these duties
would continue to be enforced as they are now. On the other hand, where the procedures of
Title VII are invoked, the remedies available are . . . injunctive relief against continued discrimination, plus appropriate affirmative action including the payment of backpay"); HousE
COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1962, H.R.
No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1962); HEARINGS ON CIVIL RIGHTS BEFORE SUBCOMM.
No. 5 OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1944 (1963) (statement of Walter Reuther).
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To observe that unions and employers are simultaneously liable
for discriminatory collective bargaining agreements, however, does
not establish that a plaintiff may recover the entire amount of his
injury from either party. 11 Some courts, while holding both unions
and employers liable, fail to specify whether they are imposing joint
and several liability. 12 Other courts have spoken of dividing liability
in various manners between union and employer, implying, perhaps,
that collection of the entire judgment from one party would not be
allowed. 13
Although only a few cases directly confront the question of
whether unions and employers are jointly and severally liable, 14 the
Supreme Court's decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 15 supports an affirmative conclusion. The Court in Albemarle held that
both employer and union should be liable for back pay except "for
reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central
statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the
economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through
past discrimination." 16 Lower courts' general recognition of some
11. C.f. Note, Union Liability for Employer .Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1980)
(arguing for union liability in all cases of contractually caused discrimination, but not differentiating among joint and several liability, apportioned liability, and liability for contribution).
12. See, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
13. See, e.g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 353 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977); Myers v.
Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 849-50 (5th Cir.), mod!fted, 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1060
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d
1251 (5th Cir. 1975) (court remands to district court for explanation of why district court imposed half the court costs on employer, half on union, but awarded total amount of back pay
against employer), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Ford v. United States Steel
Corp., 17 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 940 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (attorneys' fees division); Stevenson v.
International Paper Co., 432 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. La. 1977); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638,400
F. Supp. 993, 996-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (reducing title VII attorneys' fee award against union
from $128,000 to $50,000 in light of union's limited ability to pay and its nonprofit-making
status), ajfd sub nom. EEOC v. Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 2 Emp. Prac. Dec. 790 (N.D. Ga. 1970),
revd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971) (attorneys' fee division).
These declarations of simultaneous liability are ambiguous, however, because they do not
preclude the possibility of a plaintiff recovering all his damages from one defendant. The
decisions leave unclear whether, on the one hand, the declaration of equal 50% shares of liabil•
ity, for instance, would preclude a plaintiff from collecting more than 50% from one of the
parties, or whether, on the other hand, the even division presents a formula for final shares
after contribution.
14. See, e.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1980);
Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1389 (5th Cir. 1978) (dictum);
Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 15 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1497, 1500 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
15. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Court in Albemarle did not have to reach the question of
joint union-employer liability because the district court had refused to hold either union or
employer liable for back pay. No issue of union liability relative to the employer was
presented.
16. 422 U.S. at 421.
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form of union liability for back pay is consistent with the Albemarle
requirement that back pay be awarded so as to deter discrimination.17 It is the statute's compensatory policy, however, that requires
joint and several liability. 18 If unions and employers were not jointly
and severally liable for contractual discrimination, the inability of
one party to pay would make it impossible for a victim of discrimination to recover the full amount of his damages. Without joint and
several liability, many victims of discrimination would not be made
whole. A rule of joint and several liability would allow an injured
person to sue a solvent party for all his damages.
Signatories of a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement
should therefore be jointly and severally liable for back pay under
title VII. Once a rule of joint and several liability is established, the
problem of apportionment of back pay judgments among violators
immediately arises. 19
II.

APPORTIONMENT OF A BACK PAY JUDGMENT

A.

The Case for Contribution

If courts hold unions and employers jointly and severally liable
for signing a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement, an injured person can choose any or all of the signatories as defendants in
a title VII suit. If a union or employer singled out for suit is denied
contribution, it alone must pay the entire back pay award. Employees and other victims almost invariably sue either the employer
alone, 20 or both the employer and the union. 21 Often the union itself
17. See text at notes 70-79 infra.
18. Some courts have recognized that unions and employers are jointly and severally liable
for back pay. E.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1980)
(under title VII, "the union and the employer may be held jointly liable when the unlawful
activity was a joint undertaking"); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374,
1389 (5th Cir. 1978) ("A union is jointly liable with the employer for discrimination caused in
whole or in part by the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement"); Myers v. Gilman
Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 848-49 (5th Cir.), modified, 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977); Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 15 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1497, 1500 (N.D.
Fla. 1977). None of these cases expressly claims to impose joint liability because of title VIl's
compensatory purpose.
19. C.f. Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 15 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1497, 1500 (N.D. Fla. 1977)
("(T]he company and the labor unions are 'correctly viewed . . . as joint wrongdoers whose
concurrent acts caused plaintiffs' injuries .•• .' The disposition of the case is bifurcated, with
the initial proceeding limited to a determination of the liability, if any, of the defendants. If
joint liability is found, the second phase is for the purpose of apportioning liability among the
defendants") (citation omitted).
20. See, e.g., Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1977); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
21. See, e.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86 (3d Cir. 1980); Myers v.
Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), modified, 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 920 (1976); Osborne v. McCall Printing Co., 4 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 276, 4 Emp. Prac.
Dec. ~ 7757 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
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sues the employer as the representative of a class of injured employees. 22 Thus a rule allowing contribution would most often benefit
employers at the expense of unions.
Contribution claims arise in different ways, depending upon who
is suing and who is being sued. If an employee sues the union or
employer alone, the defendant may file a third-party claim before
trial for contribution against other parties to the agreement, or may
commence a separate suit for contribution after judgment.23 If a
union represents the plaintiff class of employees, the employer may
file a counterclaim for contribution.24 Finally, if both union and employer are sued, each may file a cross-claim against the other for
contribution or indemnifi.cation25 in the event it is found liable at
trial. 26
Title VII is silent regarding contribution claims by parties jointly
and severally liable for back pay. 27 Partly as a result of this silence,
title VII contribution claims have had a mixed reception in the
courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has endorsed contribution claims by parties who settle before trial. 28 The Fifth Circuit has
permitted contribution, but apparently requires that a party be guilty
of some degree of involvement in discrimination beyond the mere
signing of the agreement before it will be forced to contribute.29 The
District of Columbia Circuit has declined to decide the issue, saying
it is "a complex and sensitive question." 30 No district court has upheld a motion to dismiss a title VII contribution claim as a matter of
22. See, e.g., International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 73 F.R.D. 57 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Va. 1973); Blanton v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 49
F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
23. Northwest Airlines attempted to obtain contribution by both of these procedures in the
litigation now before the Supreme Court. A federal district court dismissal of a third-party
claim for contribution from the Transport Workers Union was upheld by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 476-78
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). The company also co=enced a separate
suit for contribution. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America,
606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980).
24. See cases cited at note 22 supra.
25. Indemnification shifts the entire loss from one joint tortfeasor to another who is
deemed responsible for making the full payment. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330,331
(7th Cir. 1979).
26. See, e.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86 (3d Cir. 1980); Osborne
v. McCall Printing Co., 4 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 276, 4 Emp. Prac. Dec. ~ 7757 (S.D. Ohio
1972).
27. See Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 88 (3d Cir. 1980).
28. Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86 (3d Cir. 1980); Denicola v. G.C.
Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1977).
29. Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), modffied, 556 F.2d 758 (5th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
30. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 606 F.2d 13S0, 13S6
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980).
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law,31 but some have expressed serious doubts as to whether contribution claims will succeed.32 The standard governing when contribution will be allowed therefore remains unclear. Since contribution
does not affect the plaintiff's ability to recover back pay,33 courts
should look to title VII's deterrent purpose to decide: (1) whether
contribution is appropriate; and (2) when it is appropriate, how contribution shares should be determined. 34
When the Supreme Court in A!bemar/e 35 endorsed the Eighth
Circuit's36 conclusion that the "reasonably certain prospect of a back
pay award" 37 would provide ''the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate"38 discriminatory
practices, it did not explicitly address the question of joint and several liability for discriminatory collective bargaining agreements,
and it therefore failed to reach the issue of contribution. Allowing a
right of contribution between union and employer, however, wquld
increase the effectiveness of the "spur or catalyst" of back pay at the
bargaining table.
One theoretical view of the bargaining process suggests that the
presence or absence of contribution would not affect the level of deterrence. Such a view would assume that, given any particular allocation of liability, either party (union or employer) during
bargaining would trade away a valuable benefit to achieve a discriminatory contract so long as the utility to that party of the discrimina31. For denials of motions to dismiss title VII contribution claims, see, e.g., Lynch v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267
(E.D. Va. 1973); Blanton v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 49 F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
32. See, e.g., Blanton v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 49 F.R.D. 162, 164 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
33. See text at notes 14-19 supra.
34. Some co=entators have ignored the need to preserve the deterrent effects of back pay
liability. See, e.g., Youngdahl, Suggestions far Labor Unions Faced with Liability under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 27 ARK. L. REV. 631 (1973) (discussed infra); Co=ent,
The Union as Title VII Plaintiff Affirmative Obligation to Litigate?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1388,
1412 (1978) (apparently assuming that the only deterrent effect of back pay would be to force
unions to sue in court). One early co=entator suggested that back pay liability for discriminatory contracts should not be imposed on unions, because "[t]he employer is the 'paymaster.'
[The employer] would have paid the discriminatees what they would have received had it not
been for discrimination in the past. It cannot be permitted now to pass on any of that obligation merely because it has been deferred." Youngdahl, supra at 646. This same commentator
also suggested that money damages are more properly paid by the employer than by the union
because the employees represented by the union will have to pay the cost of being displaced by
the past victims of discrimination, while the employer will not suffer such displacement. Id. at
648. However, the employer-as-sole-paymaster argument begins with an unsound premise:
the employer will not be the sole paymaster if the union abuses the bargaining process so as to
achieve a discriminatory shifting of benefits from a disfavored to a favored class of employees.
35. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
36. United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973).
37. 422 U.S.,at 417.
38. 422 U.S. at 417-18, quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th
Cir. 1973).
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tory provision exceeded the potential back pay liability. Similarly,
either party would trade away a valuable benefit to get rid of a discriminatory term if the potential liability for the term exceeded its
utility. For example, if an employer believed that by discriminating
it could improve its profitability by an amount greater than its potential liability for back pay, it would be willing to bargain away other
less valuable terms to keep the discriminatory term. Conversely, a
union that found no utility in the term itself and that feared back pay
liability would offer concessions to the employer to get rid of the
term. If bargaining proceeded ideally, the term would be included in
the final agreement if and only if the total amount the parties were
willing to pay to include the term exceeded the amount they would
pay to keep it out.39 Stated somewhat differently, if the total utility
of the term to both parties exceeded the potential total back pay liability, the term would be included; if the potential liability exceeded
the utility, bargaining would remove the term. Thus, the inclusion
or exclusion of the discriminatory term would be independent of the
particular rule of allocation. Any change in the allocation of potential back pay liability would make one party more eager to include
the term (or less eager to exclude it) but would have exactly the opposite and offsetting effect on the other party.40
But in the real world, deterrence is improved by threatening both
parties with liability. The improved deterrence arises because parties to real world bargaining are not omniscient, and may inaccurately assess the utility and liability that accompany a discriminatory
term. Imperfect information about potential liability or utility can
lead to irrational results. For example, the employer may be unaware that the contract discriminates, and may remain unaware during bargaining, if the union has no incentive to reveal the
discrimination. The employer may also misperceive the utility of the
39. If both parties are willing to "pay" - i.e., give up a valuable benefit - to keep the
term, then it will be included in the agreement. If both are willing to pay to remove the term
(though it is not likely, then, that it would have been proposed at all), then the term will be
taken out. If one party wants to keep the term while the other wants to remove it, the party
willing to pay the most will achieve its desire.
40. For example, suppose that the employer bears all the liability for back pay. Suppose
further that the potential liability is $100, the utility to the employer is $50, and the utility to
the union is $40 (total utility to both parties of $90). A rational employer would offer the
union $41 in benefits to agree to delete the discriminatory term, and both parties would gain.
The employer would give up $50 utility plus $41 in benefits but would gain $100 in lost liability for a net gain of $9. The union would give up $40 in utility for $41 in benefits for a $1 net
gain. Now suppose the utility to the employer is $70. He will not give up $111 ($70 utility plus
$41 in benefits to the union) in order to escape liability of only $100. Nor is the result changed
by making each party liable for half the back pay, or $50 each. The employer now has a $70
utility and faces $50 potential liability. To give up that $70 utility, the employer will want at
least $21 from the union; $21 plus $50 lost liabilty minus $70 utility yields a SI net gain. But,
the union cannot afford to give up that $21 in benefits plus another $40 in utility in order to
escape a $50 liability. The outcome, then, is the same no matter how the liability is apportioned.
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discriminatory term to the union and thus may not even attempt to
bargain for its removal. Requiring both parties to bargain against
discriminatory contracts will improve deterrence by increasing the
flow of information between the parties. For this reason, both parties should be encouraged by the threat of liability to bargain against
discriminatory contracts.41
Thus far, this argument establishes only that both the union and
the employer should be threatened by liability, not that contribution
should be available. If joint and several liability were the rule, and if
plaintiffs were just as likely to sue unions as to sue employers, then
both parties would be equally threatened by liability whether or not
contribution were allowed. But the cases reported suggest that victims of discrimination will sue unions much less often than they will
sue employers.42 Such a pattern would reduce the threat of back pay
liability to unions under a no-contribution rule. The only way to
ensure a balance of threats against union and employer is to allow
contribution.
Concern for fairness offers additional support for a rule allowing
contribution in title VII back pay litigation. Denying contribution
seems unfair because it "places the full burden of restitution upon
one who is only in part responsible for a plaintiffs loss."43 As the
Supreme Court recently observed, contribution promotes "a more
'equal distribution of justice' . . . by ameliorating the common-law
rule against contribution which permits a plaintiff to force one of two
violators to bear the entire loss, though the other may have been
equally or more to blame."44 Partly out of concern for fairness, federal courts have extended contribution rights in securities,45 antitrust, 46 and admiralty47 cases.
Four possible arguments against contribution in title VII back
pay suits seem unpersuasive after close examination. One objection
is that courts have traditionally allowed contribution only between
unintentional tortfeasors,48 while only "intentional" violators are lia41. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
42. See text at notes 20-22 supra.
43. Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 1968).
44. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 111 (1974).
45. See, e.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
46. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1979). But see Olson Farms Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. [1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699
(10th Cir.), rehearing en bane granted, No. 77-2068 (10th Cir. Dec, 27, 1979); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49
U.S.L.W. 3321 (1980) (No. 79-1144).
41. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
48. The English common law denied contribution to intentional tortfeasors, see Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799), as did the 1955 revision of the 1939
Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act in section l(c). A mistaken interpretation
of the Merryweather doctrine led most American jurisdictions to deny contribution to both
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ble for back pay under title VIl.49 This objection fails for two reasons. First, a very low level of intent is sufficient to violate title VII.
Proof of discriminatory intent is usually unnecessary;50 rather,
"[i]ntentional unfair employment practices are those engaged in deliberately and not accidentally."51 All that the plaintiff ordinarily
need show is a discriminatory effect to make out a prima facie case. 52
Failure to rebut the prima facie case with evidence of a valid business purpose will leave the defendant liable even though its intentions were laudable. 53 Second, the rule barring contribution between
intentional tortfeasors is neither absolute nor unquestioned. Some
courts have allowed intentional violators to receive contribution, 54
and several commentators have urged abolition of the rule barring
contribution to intentional violators. 55 In short, the rule is archaic
and should not apply to title VII violations: courts should look elsewhere for reasons to grant or deny contribution in title VII cases. 56
A second objection to contribution in title VII cases is that it violates legislative intent. In a recent dissent from a Third Circuit opinnegligent and intentional tortfeasors. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 50; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Torrfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932). Until recently, federal
common law did not provide for contribution between joint tortfeasors. See, e.g. , Halcyon
Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282,285 (1952) (contribution denied
in maritime personal injury cases); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., (1977-1) Trade Cas.
72,110, 72,111 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (denying contribution to an antitrust defendant); DiBenedetto
v. United States, (1975-1] U.S. Tax Cas. 87,330, 87,331 (D.R.I. 1974) (denying tax fraud defendant contribution).
49. Title VII empowers the court to order payment of back pay where it finds that the
defendant "has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice.•.." Section 706(g}, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
50. See Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S, Ct,
1850 (1980); United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 420-24 (7th Cir. 1978); Firefighters
Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom.
Banta v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796-97
(5th Cir.}, cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
51. Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that
"discrimination based on reliance on conflicting state statutes is an intentional unfair employment practice").
52. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 519 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1058 (1976); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218 (10th Cir. 1972).
53. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 14, Intl. Union of Operating Engrs., 415 F. Supp. 1155, 1173
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), ajfd in part, revd in part on other grounds, 553 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1977),
54. See, e.g., Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24
(1954) (per Brennan, J., now Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court) (allowing
intentional tortfeasor contribution on statutory interpretation grounds}, trialjudgment mod!fied
on remand, 25 N.J. 17, 134 A.2d 761 (1957). Several cases have granted contribution to intentional violators of the securities laws. See, e.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir,
1979); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); see generally Note, Contribution Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975
WASH. U. L.Q. 1256.
55. See Leflar, supra note 48, at 145-46; Comment, Contribution and the .Distribution of
Loss Among Torrfeasors, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 232 (1975); Note, Contribution and Antitrust
Policy, 78 MICH. L. REV. 890, 921 (1980).
56. See text at notes 41-47 supra.
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ion approving a title VII contribution award, Judge Sloviter argued
that Congress intended to deny contribution when it left express contribution provisions out of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.57 Like some
courts that deny contribution among joint antitrust violators, 58 Judge
Sloviter reasoned that the eighty-eighth Congress was aware that
federal common law barred contribution, and that it must therefore
have intended to deny contribution under title VII. 59 Judge
Sloviter's objection should be rejected for several reasons. First, it
seems more likely that Congress never considered the possibility of
contribution claims than that it intended to deny them. 60 The statute
fails clearly to specify that parties to a collective bargaining agreement are jointly and severally liable for discriminatory terms, 61
which suggests that Congress was unsure about joint and several liability, let alone about the apportionment problems that accompany
it. Second, one can read the back pay provisions of title VII as implicitly endorsing contribution rights. 62 Finally, ambiguous legislative intent seems a poor justification for rejecting a rule that would
promote the deterrent purpose that lay at the heart of congressional
resolve to pass the Civil Rights Act.
A third argument against title VII contribution rights is equally
unpersuasive. Some have warned that contribution claims will unduly complicate title VII suits. 63 Yet contribution in securities suits,
which commonly involve more defendants than title VII cases, has
not produced excessive complexity. 64 Should a court become seriously concerned that the complexity caused by a contribution claim
will impose excessive burdens upon a plaintiff, it can sever the contribution claim from the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(b).65

A final argument against contribution is that it will frustrate a
strong statutory policy favoring pre-trial settlement of title VII disputes.66 Contribution might in some cases discourage settlement:
57. Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 99 (3d Cir. 1980) (Sloviter, J.,
dissenting).
58. See, e.g., El Camino Glass v. Sunglow Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,112
(N.D. Cal. 1976). But see Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d
897, 900 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (1980) (No. 79-1144).
59. 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. at 99.
60. See Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1980).
61. 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. at 88.
62. See text at notes 35-42 supra.
63. See, e.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 100 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Sloviter, J., dissenting).
64. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1184-85 (8th Cir. 1979) (dictum).
65. See Note, supra note 55, at 916.
66. See, e.g., Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Assn., Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc.,
573 F.2d 960, 963-64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978) (title VII policy of encourag-
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defendants could not achieve repose by settling, if after settlement
they still faced potential contribution claims by non-settling violators. Courts, however, could remove such disincentives to settle by
barring contribution against settling defendants. 67 Such an exception to a general rule permitting contribution would have to be accompanied by close judicial scrutiny of "bad faith" or "collusive"
settlements between the plaintiff and one of the parties to the agreement. 68 Even if courts allow contribution claims against settling parties, the disincentive to settle may be outweighed by the prosettlement incentive created when courts permit contribution claims
by settling defendants against joint violators. 69
Having established that contribution will promote deterrence and
not impede other title VII policies, we must ask which rule for the
division of shares between union and employer will maximize deterrence. The answer comes in part from the preceding analysis: if we
seek to ensure the greatest possible deterrent effect on both parties, a
half-and-half division is ordinarily best. Courts could adopt other
rules, but if the desideratum is "self-examination"70 by both parties
of the proposed terms of employment, no other rule will so strongly
promote the exchange of information71 between the parties.
A half-and-half rule of apportionment is prima facie reasonable
because courts cannot predict in advance from which side of the bargaining table a discriminatory proposal will come. A half-and-half
rule would deter discriminatory proposals from both sides equally.
But some courts might prefer to adjust contribution shares to impose
heavier burdens on those who propose discriminatory terms or on
those who seem more likely to benefit from the term's inclusion. 72
ing settlements precludes intervenors from challenging plaintiff-by-plaintiff meri!S of class settlement); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1976) ("the clear policy in favor of encouraging settlements must
also be taken into account . . . particularly in an area where voluntary compliance by the
parties over an extended period will contribute significantly toward ultimate achievement of
statutory goals"); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970) ("In
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress placed great emphasis on private settlement
and the elimination of unfair practices without resorting to the court's injunctive powers"); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (EEOC conciliation attempt prerequisite to EEOC suit); B. ScHLEI &
P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1127 ()976 & Supp. )979),
67. Courts have uniformly denied contribution against settling antitrust defendan!S. See,
e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979). Some courts have
allowed title VII contribution claims by settling defendants against joint violators. See, e.g. ,
Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1977).
68. Court approval of class action settlements is already required under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(e). See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 66, at 1127.
69. See Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1980).
10. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
11. See text at notes 39-40 supra.
12. See Note, Union Liability Under Title VII for Employer Discrimination, 68 GEO, L.J.
959, 984-87 (1980), arguing that the only kind of contractually caused discrimination that
should automatically lead to the liability of a signatory union is discrimination caused by
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Such changes, however, would be responsive only to vague and irrelevant notions of fairness and to improper notions of causation,73 and
seem unlikely to improve deterrence.
The purpose of a rule of contribution is to encourage parties to
examine potentially discriminatory contract terms, not to punish the
culpable. 74 Merely being a proposer or a potential beneficiary of a
discriminatory term does not make a party more likely to examine
carefully the discriminatory effect of the term. Contribution shares
should be apportioned so as to insure that the party most likely to
respond to the threat of contribution liability by bargaining against
discrimination will face the largest possible threat. Since we cannot
predict in advance which party will be the more responsive, an even
apportionment of contribution shares best achieves this goal.
It remains to decide what formula for apportionment should be
used when more than two parties negotiate an agreement. Frequently, both a local union and an international union will be represented at the bargaining table. 75 The principle of even
apportionment might dictate either that each bargainingparlj' contribute equally to any judgment, or that each side in bargaining (labor and management) contribute equally.76 Apportioning half of the
judgment to labor and half to management would maximize deterrence if, as it seems safe to assume in most cases, the various groups
on either side will pool their informational resources77 and confront
the other side as a single entity.78 The two most carefully reasoned
appellate decisions confronting the question of multiple-party apporseniority provisions, because "[m]ost other employment practices described in a labor contract
are not as likely to be union-inspired, and their inclusion in the contract does not alone lead to
a presumption that there is a nexus between the discrimination they cause and the union involved." Id at 985. Because the Georgetown Note argues that unions should not be liable
unless they "cause" discrimination, it is hard to assert confidently that that Note's conclusions
would apply if the problem were recast as a question of contribution. For a broader definition
of the word "cause," one closer to this Note's analysis and (it is submitted) the bulk of the case
law, see Note, supra note 11, at 705.
13. See generally id
14. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (back pay should "spur'' selfexamination); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971) ("good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent" is not a concern of title VII).
15. See, e.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fr:_ Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1980);
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270-71 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920
(1976); Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 529 F.2d 721, 737-38 (5th Cir. 1976).
16. Compare Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 537 (D. Tex. 1974) (equal onethird shares for employer, local and international), with Stevenson v. International Paper Co.,
432 F. Supp. 390, 409 (W.D. La. 1977) (one-half share for employer, one-half share for local
and international). Both these cases impose liabilit,y shares, not contribution shares.
11. See generally R. FRANCE, UNION DECISIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1955); N.
CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 258-82 (1951).
78. Cf. Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 432 F. Supp. 390, 409 (W.D. La. 1977) ("The
International and Local 582 operate as a single entity as a practical matter. Together they
constitute one side of the table in collective bargaining sessions. With respect to the back pay
liability to employees, then, they should be considered together as one joint wrongdoer. Thus,
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tionment have approved half-and-half apportionment.79
No title VII policy requires that contribution be barred between
parties that sign a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement,
and allowing contribution usually increases deterrence of discrimination. As a general rule, courts should therefore allow contribution
among unions and employers jointly liable to workers for back pay.
Nevertheless, in some cases, barring contribution might better promote deterrence than allowing it. Section B identifies this category,
and recommends that district courts deny contribution in such cases.
B. Limiting the Right to Contribution: A Bargaining-Resistance
.Defense
A rule allowing contribution assures that a union or employer
fortunate enough not to be singled out for a title VII suit will still
contribute to any back pay award. The prospect of contribution
should usually increase incentives to bargain against a discriminatory term in a collective bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, in
some cases the threat of contribution will do little to deter a party
from accepting a discriminatory term even if it opposes the term. so
If one party to collective bargaining decides that the benefits it will
they should bear one-half the burden, not two-thirds the burden, as if each were a separate
wrongdoer.").
,
The Stevenson court pronounced the unions liable for 50% of the damages, but suggested,
following Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), modfjied, 556 F.2d 758 (5th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977), that the unions might be able to get a reduction of
their "ultimate financial burden" "through the assertion of cross-claims of contribution or indemnity between the unions and the company," 432 F. Supp. at 408. This Note suggests that
the 50% share of union responsibility should be altered only in accordance with the bargaining-resistance defense, see notes 83-96 i'!fra.
19. See Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1980); Myers
v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 849-50 (5th Cir.), modfjied, 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
80. For a cursory approval of a rule of automatic liability for both parties in all cases, see
Note, supra note 11, at 702-07 (arguing that "[b]oth the language and purpose of Title VII are
better served when a union is judged by the product of its negotiations rather than by its
unsuccessful bargaining efforts"). The Harvard Note rests on two arguments. First, a union
signatory to a discriminatory contract "causes" discrimination in violation of section 703(c)(3);
mere bargaining resistance does not negate causation. Second, the absolute liability "results"
rule will more strongly deter the creation of discriminatory contracts.
The first of these arguments is irrelevant to the question of back pay: a violation of section
703(c)(3) does not necessarily imply back pay liability. Under section 706(g), a court may
enjoin both the employer and the union from enforcing the term and yet hold the employer
solely liable for back pay. The second argument assumes that a strict liability rule would
increase bargaining resistance in all cases. But see text at notes 87-92 i'!fra. The Harvard Note
reluctantly admits that under its proffered "results" test a union is expected to make unlimited
economic sacrifice to achieve a nondiscriminatory contract. The Note apparently prefers such
an unrealistic expectation to what it concludes would be the impossible task under an "efforts
test" of prescribing "the economic value which a union should place on negotiating a nondiscriminatory contract." Id at 706 n.24. The present Note argues that such an inquiry is not
impossible. Under the rule suggested here, courts would not have to price the value of workers' rights in a speculative market of human dignity; they would merely inquire whether or not
back pay would deter discrimination in similar cases.
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have to surrender (or the costs it will have to bear) 81 to bargain away
a discriminatory term exceed its expected contribution liability, 82
that party will cease bargaining against the discriminatory term. In
other words, the "bargaining resistance" inspired by contribution is
limited by the potential contribution liability, and the resistance dissipates once the party desiring the discriminatory term offers benefits
(or imposes costs) in return for the term that exceed the other party's
expected contribution share. This limit to rational bargaining resistance suggests that deterrence might be increased by barring contribution claims against a party that had bargained against a
discriminatory term until it received a benefit that exceeded its potential liability. 83 Allowing contribution in such a case would not
alter the bargaining behavior of similarly situated parties - they
would continue to prefer title VII liability to the costs of removing
the discriminatory term.
Two examples illustrate a bargaining-resistance "defense" to a
81. A union might, for example, face an employers demand that the union accept lower
wage scales in return for exclusion of the discriminatory term. Or, a majority of union members might face the loss of benefits to be gained by minority members. In either case, the
potential lost value may be termed the "bargaining cost" to the union of gaining a non-discriminatory contract. The cost of a strike, in the event the parties reached impasse over the
term, would also be a cost of removal, to be compared with potential liability costs.
82. A party might actually compare bargaining costs with its expected contribution liability as discounted by the likelihood of suit. Merely requiring a showing that bargaining costs
exceeded undiscounted contribution liability costs would not produce bargaining by an amoral
cost-efficient union at a level in excess of the discounted contribution liability costs. But the
bargaining-resistance defense presented infra at notes 83-96 should nevertheless not be based
on a party's assessment of discounted liability costs, for two reasons.
The factual complexity of assessing the proper amount of discount would itself be a reason
to set the threshold at the undiscounted level. Parties will have varying degrees of risk-aversity. A small union, for instance, with limited self-insurance reserves, might fear a single large
back pay judgment so much that it would pay bargaining costs approaching the full amount of
potential liability costs, while a large union responsible for many different contracts, possessing
large cash reserves, would tend to bargain only up to the level of discounted liability costs,
especially where the potential liability costs were small. Because of this unpredictable variation, courts should simply presume that all unions will bargain at the undiscounted level. See
generally, Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View ofthe Economics of
Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. R.Ev. 419,468 (1980) (arguing that a strategy of punishment for organizational criminal behavior should be designed to deter both risk-preferrers and
risk-averters because "[t]here may be substantial numbers of both risk preferrers and risk
averters in th[e] relevant pool of potential offenders"); see also Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 693, 705 (1973).
Moreover, one must not assume that all unions will see the problem solely as a matter of
avoiding liability. Some unions might evaluate the problem of bargaining against discrimination as a matter of total cost and benefit to the membership as a whole. Such a union would, to
remove a discriminatory term, pay bargaining costs equal to the full undiscounted liability
costs. If the defense's hurdle were lowered to the level of discounted liability costs, such
"good" unions would be given an incentive to mioiroi:re the likelihood of employee suits by
means of secrecy or misstatement. To avoid this unwanted incentive effect, the defense threshold should be set at the level of undiscounted liability costs.
83. At least one court of appeals has absolved a union that bargained persistently and
vocally against the employers discriminatory term, but the court did not indicate why title VII
permitted such a result. See Williams v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 530 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1975).
For a similar EEOC result, see EEOC Decision No. 70112, 2 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 410 (1969).
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contribution claim. 84 Consider first an employer who wants to make
employees and outside applicants for a certain position take a test
that a union believes to be discriminatory. During collective bargaining, the employer may offer a union wage increases or fringe
benefits in return for its acceptance of the discriminatory test. If the
value of the benefits exceeds the amount the union expects it would
pay in contribution claims, the union may accept the employer's offer. 85 Imagine second that the employer offers no benefit in exchange for the union's acceptance of the test, but instead insists that
the union must strike to excise the term it believes to be discriminatory. 86 If the union believes that the costs of a strike exceed its potential liability for contribution, it may choose to sign an agreement
containing the offensive term. In these two cases, allowing contribution will not increase -deterrence. The question then becomes
whether some other apportionment scheme might increase deterrence in these cases, and whether the costs of identifying these cases
outweigh the additional deterrence that might result from creating
an exception to a rule allowing contribution.
Denying employer claims for contribution from unions 87 that
have bargained to the limit of their rational resistance would promote deterrence in three ways. First, employee plaintiffs may be less
reluctant to bring title VII suits against employers if courts recognize
84. Although this Note discusses the desirability of a bargaining-resistance defense to a
contribution claim, the same reasoning might support a bargaining-resistance cause of action
for indemnification. If a plaintiff sues an employer alone, and the employer sues a union for
contribution, the bargaining-resistance defense comes into play. If a plaintiff sues both the
employer and the union, and if the union would have had a bargaining-resistance defense to
contribution had the employer alone been sued, the union should be able lo sue the employer
for indemnification.
85. If a union decided that the cost of bargaining away a discriminatory term exceeded the
potential cost of back pay liability for the inclusion of the term, it might decide as a matter of
economic prudence to incur liability rather than pay the bargaining costs. Even a union that
took its minority members' rights seriously might make the same calculation in cost/benefit
terms. The union's potential liability could be considered equal to the minority employees'
lost benefits. If the cost to all employees of obtaining that benefit exceeded the value of the
benefit, the union would have no reason to make the trade.
86. An employer might insist upon a discriminatory term even when the term offered him
a marginal benefit, if he wished to establish his credibility in later bargaining. See C. STEVENS, STRATEGY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATION 86-87 (1963); N. CHAMBER·
LAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 219 (1951).
87. A resisting employer faced with union insistence on a discriminatory term might also
be entitled to a bargaining-resistance defense in some cases. The employer in such cases occupies an analogous position to a resisting union, but not an identical one. The concern that
employees would be deterred from suing their union would not necessarily apply to the employer. As a practical matter, a union's inability to pay large back pay awards might cause
jointly liable employers to pay a judgment regardless of contribution rules. Cf. Rios v.
Steamfitters Local 638, 400 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (recognizing need to adjust title VII
attorneys' fee award in light of union's being a relatively shallow-pocketed organization not
operated for profit), qffd, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1976). Most of the
arguments in this Note supporting a defense for the resisting union, however, support a defense for the resisting employer as well.
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a bargaining-resistance defense to contribution claims against unions. If contribution is always allowed, union members may be reluctant to sue because they know that their union will be forced to
contribute to any back pay award. The employee may be particularly reluctant to sue where the union has bargained actively against
the discriminatory term, but has accepted it because the employer
demanded an unacceptably high price for its removal. The deterrent
rationale for back pay remedies under title VII depends on the encouragement of private title VII actions; 88 to the extent a universal
contribution rule inhibits private suits, a bargaining-resistance defense would enhance deterrence.
Second, protecting a union with a bargaining-resistance defense
might encourage it to bargain against a discriminatory term in cases
where it would otherwise remain silent. If employers had a uniform
right to contribution, a union desiring to excise a discriminatory
term might decide that to try and fail is worse than never having
tried at all. If the union were unsure that it could successfully negotiate for the term's omission, 89 it might prefer complete passivity because a vigorous attack on the term would publicize the existence of
the term and increase the likelihood of employee suits.90 It might
also conclude that if it did try to bargain against the term, it would
risk trading away employee benefits without gaining a freedom from
back pay liability. 91 A bargaining-resistance defense would establish
88. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
89. !fa union had perfect information about each party's utility and potential liability, and
if each party were rational, then the union could always predict the outcome of negotiations
for the removal of discriminatory terms. In the real world, however, imperfect information
and stubborn parties make such prediction hazardous in many cases. See lecture by Maurice
J. Tobin (May 16 and 18, 1949), reprinted in INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 76, 81-82 (C. Knight ed. 1950); text at note 41 supra.
90. Cf. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 719 (1976) (discussing, in a slightly different context, the relatively high "level of visibility" ofa union's contract negotiation, making
it subject to thorough review by the membership).
91. See C. STEVENS, supra note 86, at 103-07. Professor Stevens observes that a party to
collective bargaining faces "a rather delicate problem," id. at 105, in attempting to change an
"ostensible position, with the intention of conveying information to one's opposite number
about one's equilibrium position [the minimum bargaining point at which one is willing to
conclude an agreement]," id.; J. DUNLOP & J. HEALY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PRINCIPLES
AND CASES 65 (rev. ed. 1953) (Despite the bargaining convention that all offers in a "package"
proposal "are provisions and may be formally withdrawn if there is not settlement of the total
dispute. . . . [o]ffers made are seldom effectively withdrawn, except when one side or the
other has suffered serious defeat in a strike or lockout.").
A union that has decided to remain passive during bargaining might attempt to minimize
its losses by suing the employer over the discriminatory term as quickly as possible after signing the agreement, thereby reducing the period over which back pay would be calculated. See
Comment, supra note 34, at 141 l. The union would not escape liability for its share of back
pay by bringing such a suit. See Communications Workers of America v. New York Tel. Co.,
8 Emp. Prac. Dec. 5356 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (union improper class representative because union
could itself face liability if contract term proved discriminatory). One author argues that the
strict liability rule encourages union suits in this fashion. See Comment, supra note 34, at
1412. But see Note, supra note 11, at 704 n.16. To the extent that allowing contribution en-
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a threshold of resistance beyond which a union would not have to
go; the existence of this horizon would allow unions to bargain affirmatively without fearing that their resistance, if followed by failure, would be worse than no resistance at all.
Finally, denying contribution in these cases would do more than
encourage employees to sue and unions to resist; it would double the
potential liability of employers who insist upon discriminatory
terms. This doubling of potential liability might cause some employers to consider for the first time the value of a long established discriminatory practice. 92 It might also cause some employers to
abandon terms that they would have desired if they were certain that
unions would bear half of any back pay award.
Allowing unions to assert a bargaining-resistance defense to employer contribution claims would therefore significantly increase title
VII deterrence through its effects on employees, unions, and employers. It remains to establish a workable standard that district courts
can apply in granting or denying a bargaining-resistance defense to
contribution claims. Since the rationale behind the bargainingresistance defense rests upon deterrence, the standard should tum
upon the deterrent effect of contribution. When a union asserts a
bargaining-resistance defense to contribution, the district court
should ask whether allowing contribution will in the future deter
similarly situated unions from signing discriminatory collective bargaining agreements. Contribution will not deter if the union's excourages unions to sue over discriminatory terms, rather than negotiate their removal, it undermines the policies of the statute. A plaintiff union in such a suit would be unlikely to
provide the best possible challenge to alleged discrimination:
[U]nions forced into the courtroom by fear of Title VII liability would be less than ideal
advocates. Motivated solely by its desire to avoid liability, the union would have absolutely no stake in the outcome of the ''test case." If the court invalidated the questionable
provision, the threat of liability would be removed. If no Title VII violation were found,
the union would likewise emerge "victorious." Regardless of the outcome, the union's
sole objective - avoidance of liability - would be achieved.
Comment, supra note 34, at 1412. Inexplicably, this Comment seems to assume that a union
would be immune to back pay claims if it were a plaintiff. Plaintiff unions have no such
immunity, for employers can file counterclaims for contribution. See cases cited at note 22
supra. A union strategy of bargaining passivity followed by a quick suit undermines the goal
of title VII to promote compliance with the statute at the bargaining table rather than in the
courtroom. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975),
92. The bargaining-resistance defense may encourage separate discussion of discriminatory terms, thereby causing parties to assess carefully the value of discrimination. Cf. Al. bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (recommending that employers and
unions examine and evaluate their employment practices). Without a bargaining-resistance
defense, bargaining over the discriminatory term may become enmeshed with other issues in a
"package deal," and the employer may never be forced to reevaluate the value of the practice
to him. See C. STEVENS, supra note 86, at 44 (discussing the phenomenon of "package" settlements of collective bargaining disagreements). Some troublesome terms may be settled by
placing them in a package with other terms and reaching a "covert agreement" to include them
in the final agreement without specific discussion of the troublesome terms. To parties reaching such a package settlement, "it is the total cost of that package that matters," not the cost of
individual items in the package. Id
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pected liability falls short of the costs of bargaining away the
discriminatory term. The court should therefore bar contribution
where a union can show that it bargained against a discriminatory
term and reasonably concluded that the costs of removing the term
exceeded the potential back pay liability.
This standard is, admittedly, difficult to apply. Each of the variables the court must balance - the potential liability93 and the costs
of removing the term94 - defies precise measurement. And the standard requires courts to examine the machinations of collective bargaining, a task some judges have found distasteful. 95 Nevertheless,
the standard has much to recommend it. Combined with joint and
several liability and a general right to contribution, the bargainingresistance defense assures that back pay awards will effectively promote the compensatory and deterrent purposes of title VII. The
standard also assures that experienced district judges will retain a
limited, but desirable, measure of discretion in adjudicating title VII
contribution claims. 96 These advantages make it worthwhile for
courts to assume the administrative burden incident to a bargaining
resistance defense. The next section considers a final objection to the
defense.
C. Preserving the Incentive to Seek Relief Under Section 8(a)(5)
Unions need not rely on bargaining alone to get rid of discrimi93. Potential back pay liability is speculative even at the time of suit. Courts will have to
consider what the union reasonably believed to be the potential liability at the time of bargaining. The time. period during which back pay is assessed is fairly certain during bargaining,
however: it is the life of the contract or of the discriminatory provision, subject to the two-year
limitation provided in section 706(g). See note 9 supra.
94. These costs include the value of benefits the union received in return for accepting the
discriminatory term and the costs of a strike (if necessary) to remove the term. Neither cost is
easily measured.
95. See generally Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
719-20 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring and dissenting) (in determining whether the labor exemption from the antitrust laws applies, "an attempted inquiry into the motives of employers
or unions for entering into collective bargaining agreements on subjects of mandatory bargaining is totally artificial"); R. GORMAN, supra note 90, at 561-62 (some courts reluctant to examine bargaining history as evidence of arbitrability as a disputed issue). But cf. id. at 339-41,
where Professor Gorman discusses the necessary intrusion by the NLRB into the collective
bargaining process when determining whether and when an economic strike is converted by an
employer's bad-faith bargaining into an unfair labor practice strike:
[p]articularly in a complex bargaining situation where many issues are discussed and
many compromises necessary before an economic strike will be settled, it may be difficult
to ascertain whether any one issue, economic or otherwise, is preventing settlement. In
such instances, the Board must tum to such evidence of union motive as union telegrams,
union newspaper advertisements, statements made at union meetings, and personal recollections of collective bargaining sessions.
96. See United Statc:s v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1060 (5th Cir. 1973)
("The apportionment problem is initially one for the district judge . . ."), cert. denied sub nom.
United States Steel v. Ford, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498
F.2d 641,655 (5th Cir. 1974) ("apportionment of the responsibility for equitable relief in a case
such as this one falls within the sound discretion of the district court").
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natory contract terms. Rather than bargain for the term's omission,
a union can seek a determination that the term is illegal under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.97 If the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") decides that the term is illegal
and that the employer has either insisted on it to the point of impasse
or made it a condition of agreement, the Board may order the employer to withdraw the term and proceed with bargaining. 98 Although there is no general duty to file unfair labor practice charges, a
union may be spurred to initiate a section 8(a)(5) proceeding by the
fear of liability under title VII. 99 Indeed, if section 8(a)(5) proceedings were truly a cost-free and infallible means of excluding discriminatory terms from collective bargaining agreements, unions would
always resort to them rather than attempt to bargain away the illegal
discriminatory term. A bargaining-resistance defense would be undesirable if section 8(a)(5) proceedings involved little cost because
the defense might encourage unions to sign discriminatory agreements that could easily have been challenged before the NLRB.
Section 8(a)(5) proceedings, however, do entail significant costs
for the union that initiates them. One such cost is the poisoned bargaining atmosphere that may follow the union's resort to the NLRB.
After the conclusion of the section 8(a)(5) proceedings, the employer
might adopt a much tougher bargaining stance with regard to such
mandatory subjects as wages and pension benefits. This would effectively force the union to purchase the employees' title VII entitlements at a substantial cost. However, in the procedural context in
which this question would arise, the cost would be largely conjectural.100 A second cost of section 8(a)(5) proceedings is delay: bargaining on all issues may be suspended while the section 8(a)(5)
charges are pending. If the NLRB eventually finds that the employer has violated section 8(a)(5), some retroactive relief may be
possible, but the portion of the employees' lost wages in the form of
delayed contractual benefits will not be recoverable. 101 Finally, the
union risks that the NLRB will find the employer not to have vio97. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
98. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); R. GORMAN,
supra note 90, at 498 (discussing Borg-Warner).
99. If the cost of a section 8(a)(5) proceeding is greater than the potential liability, the
rational union will forgo the section 8(a)(5) proceeding and suffer the consequences. If the cost
of a section 8(a)(5) proceeding is less than the potential liability but exceeds the cost of bargaining for the term's removal, the rational union will simply pay those bargaining costs.
100. The issue will not arise unless the union has not filed a section 8(a)(5) complaint.
Only during a subsequent lawsuit by the injured parties would the question arise of what the
union would have lost in wages and benefits had it filed a section 8(a)(5) complaint. •
IOI. Even where the employer has in fact refused to bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5),
the Supreme Court has held that the Board may not award the equivalent of forgone contractual benefits to the employees damaged by this refusal. The NLRA does not allow the Board
to decide what terms the parties would have agreed to had the employer not refused to bargain. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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lated section 8(a)(5). 102
Even if section 8(a)(5) proceedings cost nothing, some unions
might forgo them for reasons unrelated to the availability of the bargaining-resistance defense. Not all proposals that expose unions to
title VII liability can be removed by resort to the NLRB during bargaining. The employer violates section 8(a)(5) only if it insists on an
illegal term to the point of impasse, or conditions agreement to
mandatory terms on the union's agreement to the illegal proposal.
By disguising its insistence on a discriminatory term as a mere proposal, an employer with great bargaining power may be able to
evade section 8(a)(5) liability, yet still secure agreement to the discriminatory term. A weak union facing a powerful employer might
therefore decide that a section 8(a)(5) complaint would be pointless.103
The bargaining-resistance defense only eliminates the incentive
to file section 8(a)(5) actions when the union's bargaining costs exceed its potential back pay liability and the costs of the section
8(a)(5) proceeding are less than its potential liability. In such a case,
the union could eliminate the discriminatory term at a cost less than
its potential liability by initiating section 8(a)(5) proceedings, yet it
will choose to accept the discriminatory contract because that choice
costs nothing. While it would be theoretically desirable to eliminate
the bargaining-resistance defense where these inequalities hold, it
would be hard to prove that a case falls within the exception. The
costs of a poisoned bargaining atmosphere or of delay in bargaining,
though potentially great, are inherently speculative. If the union
were given the burden of proving that the costs of section 8(a)(5)
proceedings exceeded its potential liability, it could rarely meet that
burden, and the bargaining-resistance defense (and its added deterrence) would never be utilized. To avoid this undesirable result,
courts should instead afford employers a chance to prove th~t unions
102. The likelihood of NLRB error is another cause of delay. Title VII questions are complex. See, e.g., Southwestern Pipe, Inc. v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1971) (reversing
NLRB findings that employer's proposal was illegal under title VII). Section 8(a)(5) actions
would probably be the only context in which the NLRB would ever be called upon to decide
title VII issues. The likelihood of NLRB error might encourage the losing party to seek appellate review by refusing to abide by the NLRB's order. See Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 § lO(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976).
103. See R. GORMAN, supra note 90, at 497-98. Professor Gorman criticizes the Supreme
Court's distinction in the Borg-Warner case between permissive and mandatory terms; his
observations are equally true of bargaining over illegal terms. The Borg-Warner rule, writes
Gorman,
makes the existence of an unfair labor practice turn upon the very nice distinction between proposing and insisting, a distinction that is foreign to the practicalities of collective
bargaining . . . . [I]t is doubtful that it is practicable to forbid insistence on permissive
(and, by extension, illegal] subjects, since a strong party at the bargaining table can realistically do so without much fear of legal reprisal, if only by disguising its insistence as
related to a mandatory subject (and then relenting on that insistence when the other party
makes a concession on the truly desired permissive [or illegal] subject).
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would have prevailed in section 8(a)(5) proceedings at a reasonable
cost when unions assert a bargaining-resistance defense to contribution.104 If the employer fails to carry this burden, the courts should
recognize the bargaining-resistance defense even though the union
has failed to attack the discriminatory proposal through a section
8(a)(5) proceeding.
CONCLUSION

Courts could fashion rules of back pay liability and apportionment that would promote the compensatory and deterrent purposes
of title VII. For a variety of reasons, they have failed to do so. This
Note identifies the most desirable set of rules, a~d urges courts to
1
adopt them:
(1) Parties that sign a discriminatory collective bargaining
agreement should be jointly and severally liable for back pay.
(2) When a plaintiff sues only one party to a discriminatory
agreement for back pay, the party should usually have a right to
contribution from other signatories.
(3) Contribution shares should be apportioned among the signatories such that management and labor each bear one half of any
back pay award.
(4) Unions that have unsuccessfully resisted a discriminatory
term during collective bargaining should be immune from contribution claims if the costs of removing the discriminatory term appeared
to exceed their potential back pay liability.
(5) An employer should be able to overcome this "bargainingresistance defense" to a contribution claim if it can prove that the
union could have removed the term through section 8(a)(5) proceedings at a ,cost below its potential back pay liability.

104. Where the discriminatory term proposed by the employer was clearly -illegal under
existing precedent (which reduces the likelihood of NLRB error) and the employer was rela•
tively weak (which reduces both the likelihood that the employer could successfully disguise its
insistence on the term as a mere proposal and that the employer would reduce employee benefits punitively in the bargaining following the NLRB's order), the costs of section S(a)(S) proceedings probably would have been quite low, and contribution should probably be allowed.

